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3LU DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Virginia has established a judicial definition of "unambiguous and clear."
West Virginia now has opinions stating what is clear and what is not.
TORTS-ACTION FOR WRONGFUL LIFE BY ADULTERINE
BASTARD AGAINST HIS FATHER-DAMNUM
ABSQUE INJURIA
In an unusual and novel case of first impression in Illinois, the plaintiff
sued his father for damages for causing him to be born an adulterine
bastard, raising constitutional questions and presenting two theories of
recovery, one in tort and the other in contract.' The complaint averred,
inter alia: that the plaintiff's father induced the plaintiff's mother to have
sexual relations by promising to marry her; that this promise was not and
could not be kept because the father was already married; that the promise
was fraudulent; that the acts of the defendant were willful and injured
the plaintiff in his person, property and reputation by causing him to be
born an adulterine bastard. The plaintiff claimed damages for the depriva-
tion of his right to be a legitimate child, to have a normal home, to have a
legal father, to inherit from his father, to inherit from his paternal ances-
tors2 and for being stigmatized as a bastard. On the defendant's motion3
the trial court dismissed the suit for legal insufficiency of the complaint.
The plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois which
refused to hear the case and transferred it to the Illinois Appellate Court
which, in a lengthy opinion containing much dicta, affirmed the dismissal.
Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
The question presented on appeal was whether the complaint stated a
cause of action in tort. This question, in turn, divided itself into other
thought-provoking questions. The first, prompted by the unique averments
of the complaint, was whether the act of the defendant was a legal wrong,
a tortious act? The court found that the defendant's act was willful in that
he was completely indifferent to the foreseeable consequences of his act;
that he pursued a course of conduct which showed a conscious disregard
1 The Constitutional questions were disposed of under the rule stated in City of Chi-
cago v. Campbell, 27 Ill. App. 2d 456, 170 N.E.2d 19 (1960): "If a case in which consti-
tutional issues are advanced is transferred to the Appellate Court, it must be concluded
that the Supreme Court has determined no such issues are involved or that they are not
material to the disposition of the appeal." The contract theory was not available because
the complaint sounded in tort.
2 The trial court pointed out that a legitimate child had no absolute right of inherit-
ance because he could be disinherited by will.
3 The motion to strike contained three grounds: (a) an illegitimate child has no
rights against its father under the common law; (b) all rights of an illegitimate father
and child are governed by statute; and (c) at the time of the alleged cause of action,
plaintiff was not in being.
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for the rights of others; that he knew he could not marry the woman nor
legitimatize a child born as a result of his act, and therefore the court held
that the defendant's act was not only morally wrong but tortious in its
nature.
The question of whether a tort had been committed upon the mother
was not determined by the Illinois Appellate Court. It pointed out that
the determinative question was whether a tort had been committed upon
the child. This posed the second question: Could a tort be inflicted upon a
being simultaneously with its conception? The court then proceeded to
discuss the question of when life begins and the changes which had taken
place in the law pertaining to prenatal physical injuries. The Massachu-
setts case of Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton4 appears to have been
the first case either in England or the United States to pass upon the right
of an unborn child to recover damages for a tort. Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the court, said "that, as the unborn child was a part of the
mother at the time of the injury, any damage" could be recoverable only
by her. 5 In Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital6 the Illinois Supreme Court held
that while regarding an unborn child as in esse for some purposes, this
doctrine had not been extended to allow an action for injuries sustained
before birth.7
This rule was changed in Amann v. Faidy8 where Mr. Justice Schaefer,
after carefully reviewing the pertinent cases in Illinois and other jurisdic-
tions, held that a viable child, who suffered prenatal injuries and was
thereafter born alive, had a right of action against the defendant whose
negligence caused the injuries. Daley v. Meir9 further enlarged the rule by
4 138 Mass. 14 (1884). 5 Id. at 17.
6 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
7 Many of our courts were disturbed by the inconsistency and unfairness of holding
that a child en ventre sa mere was a human being for inheritance and property rights
purposes but not one if it suffered tortious physical injury. In 1946 a major breakthrough
occurred. In Bonbrest v. Klotz, 65 F. Supp. (D.C.) 138 (1946), the plaintiff sued to
recover for injuries sustained when she was allegedly taken from her mother's womb
through professional malpractice. The defendant sought to dispose of the case by a
motion for summary judgment. The court denied the motion and held that because
the child was viable it had locus standi in that court to maintain the action.
8 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
9 33 111. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961). See also, Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,
157 A.2d 497 (1960). Action for injuries sustained by the infant plaintiff while in the
womb of his mother when injured in an automobile collision caused by the defendant's
negligence. The age of the foetus at the time of injury was 6 months. The court found
for the plaintiff stating that an averment as to the viability of the child at the time
of the injury was not necessary to state a cause of action. Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267,
164 A.2d 93 (1960). Action on behalf of a child born a Mongoloid, as a result of injuries
received in an automobile collision when a foetus of 1 month. The court held that
the child had a right of action. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504,
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
holding that a child whether viable or not at the time of the injury could
maintain an action for injuries provided it was born alive and survived. 10
This was the law in Illinois up until the present case."
The court, after commenting on the present trend of the law toward
permitting actions for physical injuries occurring closer to the moment of
conception, reflected that if there was human life, proved by subsequent
birth, then that human life had the same rights at the time of conception
as it had at any time thereafter.
By way of bringing the real issue into finer focus, the court posited
these questions: "what if the wrongful conduct takes place before con-
ception? Can [a person] be held accountable if his act was completed be-
fore the plaintiff was conceived?' 2 By the employment of hypothetical
cases, accompanied by self-answering queries, and fortified by Piper v.
Hoard,'3 the court answered these questions in the affirmative. In the
Piper Case, a girl, over 20 years of age, was permitted to maintain an action
for pecuniary damage suffered by her as a result of a fraud perpetrated on
her mother before the mother's marriage and her own conception. 4 The
court then said:
Returning to the present case, ... it is not too important whether the plaintiff's
life began during or subsequent to the act of procreation. There is no certainty
as to the exact moment conception takes place .... The seed was planted, the
life process was started, life ensued and birth followed. The defendant's wrong-
ful act simultaneously procreated the being whom it injured.' 5
93 S.E. 2d 727 (1956). Action brought by a child for alleged tortious injuries sustained
while the child was in the mother's womb. The court held that a child born after re-
ceiving tortious injury at any period after conception has a cause of action for such
injuries.
10 It is interesting to note that the Restatement of Torts inclusive of its most recent
supplement (1954) still states that "A person who negligently causes harm to an unborn
chidl is not liable to such child for the harm." The Restatement takes no view if the act
is intentional or reckless and without excuse.
11 For a detailed analysis of the development of the prenatal injury doctrine, see
Comment, 3 DEPAUL L. REV. 257 (1954). See also, Note, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 361 (1962).
1241 111. App. 2d 240, 250, 190 N.E.2d 849, 853 (1963).
1a 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887).
14 Note here the similarity between the instant case and the cited one in that in both,
the mother was fraudulently deceived from which injury resulted to the child thereafter
conceived. But in the Piper Case tile court bottomed its decision on the theory that the
plaintiff was the one injured by the fraud perpetrated on the mother. On the other hand
in the instant case the court proceeded on the theory that the plaintiff was injured
by the act of intercourse and ignored the fraud perpetrated on the plaintiff's mother
as being the basis for the tort action. One wonders whether if the court had accepted
the contract, third party beneficiary theory (the father's breach of promise to marry tile
mother which caused the injury complained of), its decision would have been the same
as that rendered in the Piper Case which was based on a tort theory.
1541 Ill. App. 2d 240, 252, 190 N.E.2d 849, 855 (1963).
CASE NOTES
The court then considered the character of the plaintiff's injury. In
that connection it was recognized that injuries other than physical or to'
property were compensable and that the complaint set forth averments
which endeavored to come within the scope of mental suffering and def-
amation. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co.,"6 a case of first impression in Illinois
involving the right of privacy, held that actions were permissible for in-
tentionally caused mental suffering. 17 The only averment in the complaint
in Zepeda v. Zepedals savoring of mental distress stated: "His father has
wilfully injured and wronged him.., in stigmatizing him as an adulterine
bastard." The court said,
To some persons the shame of being an adulterine bastard might cause as
genuine and severe emotional distress as that resulting from other serious
provocation. However, in the absence of proper and adequate averments, we
must hold that the complaint states no cause of action for this tort. If it did
outline such an action, it would be an interesting speculation whether a charge
of mental distress and emotional suffering could be made and sustained in be-
half of an infant.19
The complaint alleged, in addition, that the plaintiff was deprived of
equality with the legitimate child he might have been but the court
pointed out that an illegitimate child cannot be given rights superior to
those of a legitimate child.
A legitimate child has the natural right to be wanted, loved and cared for. He
also has an interest in preserving his family life and he may protect this interest
against outside disturbance.20 However, a legitimate child cannot maintain an
action against his own parents for lack of affection, for failure to provide a
pleasant home, for disrupting the family life or for being responsible for a
divorce which has broken up the home.21
Therefore, the court concluded, the plaintiff had not stated a cause of
action in this count.
After recognizing that the plaintiff suffered an injury, the court traced
the evolution of the law's treatment of bastards from the common law
until that day pointing out that many of the hardships imposed by law
had been liberalized so that in Illinois an illegitimate child had the right
16 347 I11. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
17 Accord, Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
1841 I11. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
19 41 IM. App. 2d 240, 254, 190 N.E.2d 849, 855 (1963). The infant was born April 12,
1959; the complaint was filed January 2, 1960. Could a child of such tender age compre-
hend the vast implications of being born an adulterine bastard so that he could experi-
ence mental distress and emotional suffering traceable to this knowledge?
The court also concluded that the complaint did not state a cause of action for defa-
mation because the necessary averment of publication was lacking.
20 Johnson v. Luhman, 330 I11. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947).
2141 IM. App. 2d 240, 255, 190 N.E.2d 849, 856 (1963).
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to his father's surname, either or both of his parents could be compelled
to support and educate him until he became eighteen years of age, his
parents had custodial rights, he could be legitimatized by the marriage of
his parents, and so on.22
The court further reflected that while these statutes were praiseworthy:
they do not, and no law can make these children whole. Children born illegiti-
mate have suffered an injury. If legitimation does not take place, the injury is
continuous. If legitimation cannot take place the injury is irreparable .... An
illegitimate's very birth places him under a disability. It is of this that the plain-
tiff complains.... Be that as it may, the quintessence of his complaint is that he
was born and that he is. Herein lies the intrinsic difficulty of this case, a diffi-
culty which gives rise to this question: Are there overriding legal, social, judi-
cial or other considerations which should preclude recognition of a cause of
action? 23
In the course of its opinion the court then proceeded to run the gamut
of possibilities that might arise if this action were to be recognized (e.g.,
an infant could bring an action for being born of a certain color, of a
certain race, with a hereditary disease, in a poor family, etc.), and pre-
sented these possibilities as cogent reasons for denying the right to recover
in the instant case.
From the court's opinion there emerged the following assertions: (a)
the act of the defendant was tortious, (b) a tort could be inflicted upon a
being simultaneously with its conception just as it could be inflicted prior
thereto, but (c) the complaint was deficient in that it lacked proper and
adequate averments as to an actionable tort. However, with refreshing
frankness the court recognized its inconsistency in calling the injury a
tort and then questioning the plaintiff's right to maintain an action to
recover for it. Nonetheless seriously concerned about (a) the creation of
a new tort, a cause of action for wrongful life, (b) the vast implications
and the staggering social impact thereof, (c) the statistical data on illegit-
imate births and the tremendous increase thereof, (d) opening the flood
gates of litigation wide to related actions, and (e) the fear of "judicial"
legislation and the sweeping result if indulged in here, and deterred there-
by, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the complaint.24
22See generally, 26 BROOKLYN L. REv. 45 (1959); 38 B.U.L. REv. 299 (1953), 15
FORDHAM L. REV. 282 (1946). See also, Illinois Paternity Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1061
(1961).
2341 I11. App. 2d 240, 258, 190 N.E.2d 849, 857 (1963).
24 This case is now pending in the Supreme Court of Illinois, this time on a petition
for leave to appeal "as a matter of right" where it has already been orally argued and
taken for decision.
